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ADMISSIBILITY

IN TENNESSEE OF SPOUSES' TESTIMONY

CONCERNING THEIR PRIVATE AFFAIRS
In Tennessee neither husband nor wife may testify to matters occurring
between them by reason of the marital relation.' The purpose of this rule is
to insure "a free exchange of confidences" between husband and wife upon
the theory that mutual confidence is a necessary element of successful marriage.2 The other states agree in principle; every state places some restriction
upon the testimony of husband and wife. 3 Although this Note is primarily
concerned with Tennessee law, there are differences in the restrictions imposed
by various states which make some comparison desirable. The common law
is the starting point.
I. THE COMMON LAW

RULES OF( MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION

A. Incompetence of One Spouse to Testify for the Other 4

At common law when one spouse was a party the other could not be a
witness for him. 5 The party was incompetent; it was thought that his testimony
was untrustworthy because of his interest in the outcome. Husband and wife
were one in the eyes of the law; their interests were ordinarily the same;
they were biased by the affection betiveen them. Therefore, when one was a
party, both were incompetent, because they were considered untrustworthy
6

witnesses.

B. Incompetence of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other
Also when one spouse was a party the other could not be a witness
against him.8 The incompetence of the witness was required by a public
policy embracing three separate considerations: (1) Marital discord would
attend the appearance of one spouse against the other. Parties were adversaries; so were witnesses to some extent. To preserve the "peace of families,"
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9777 (Williams, 1934) (civil cases); McCormick v. State,
135 Tenn. 218, 186 S. W. 95 (1916) (criminal cases).
2. Harp v. State, 158 Tenn. 510, 513, 14 S. W. 2d 720 (1928).
3. 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 226 (1935).
4. On this general topic, see 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 600-20 (3d ed. 1940); 5
JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE §§ 2128-42 (2d ed. 1926); 1 BL. CoMm. *443.
5. Owen v. State, 89 Tenn. 698, 16 S. W. 114 (1891) ; Goodwin v. Nicklin, 53 Tenn.
256 (1871) ; Kelly v. Proctor, 41 N. H. 139 (1860) ; Johnston v. Slater, 11 Gratt. 321
(Va. 1854); Stapleton v. Crofts, 18 Q. B. 367, 118 Eng. Rep. 137 (1852).
6. "The unity of interest of the husband and wife would necessarily e.xclude both,
when either is incompetent." Patton v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 101, 113 (1878).
7. On this general topic, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2227-45 (3d ed. 1940); 5
JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE §§ 2128-42 (2d ed. 1926) ; 1 BL. Commax. *443.
8. Kimbrough v. Mitchell, 38 Tenn. 539 (1858); Brewer v. Ferguson, 30 Tenn. 564
(1851) ; Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408 (1867); Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281 (1868).
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the witness would not be heard.9 (2) Marital confidence would be violated
by the disclosure of private affairs of husband and wife. As a result secretive
behavior would replace the frankness desirable between them. 10 (3) Incrimination of one spouse by the other would be repugnant as akin to selfincrimination."
II.

STATUTES

PROTECTING

MARITAL

COMMUNICATIONS

12

In most states the rules of the common law have been abrogated or
modified and husband and wife are competent witnesses for or against each
other. 13 However the common law policy of protecting marital confidence has
continued to have an important effect upon the testimony of married persons.
Some forty states have by statute adopted testimonial restrictions which in
certain situations prevent disclosure by husband or wife of private communications between them; 14 and a similar result is reached by the courts in the
15
absence of statute.
A. The Nature of the Testimonial Restrictions

The marital communications statutes are of two general types: one makes
the testimony inadmissible; the other creates a privilege against its admission.
The important difference is that the privilege may be waived 16 and the

9. "[T]o admit such evidence would occasion domestic dissensions and discord."
Goodwin v. Nicklin, 53 Tenn. 256, 258 (1871).

10. "[T]he consciousness that this might be done, would be productive of reserve,
distrust, and anxiety." Brewer v. Ferguson, 30 Tenn. 564, 567 (1851).
11. "No public policy is sound which .. .by means of the evidence of one, consigns
the other to the gallows, the penitentiary, or the jail." Norman v. State, 127 Tenn. 340,
355, 155 S.W. 135, 139 (1912).
12. On this general topic, see 8 WIGIMORE, EVID NCE §§ 2332-41 (3d ed. 1940) : Hines,
Privileged Testimony of Husband and Wife in California,19 CALIF. L. REV. 390 (1931) ;
Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations,
13 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929); Note, 30 ILL. L. REV. 783 (1936).
13. The rules of evidence which restrict the evidence of married witnesses have been
codified in almost every state. The table below is based upon 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN
FATILY LAWS § 226 (1935). Only statutes which are clearly restrictive are tabulnted.

Husband or Wife as Witness for the Other
Incompetenf ......
..........................

Witness-spouse must consent
.......
Husband or Wife as Witness Against the Other
Incompetent ...........................................
Party-spouse must consent .................
Witness-spouse must consent ......................
Both spouses must consent ..........................

Civil Cases Criminal Cases
4 states
4 states
I state
12 states
9 states
14 states
1 state
no states

16
8
9
8

states
states
states
states

Communications between Husband and Wife
Inadmissible
16 states
Witness-spouse must consent
7 states
"Other-snouse" must consent
16 states
Both snouses must consent
1 state
14. See table, note 13, supra.
15. E q.,McCormick v. State, 135 Tenn. 218, 186 S.W. 95 (1916). See Note, 27
L. R. A. (N.s.) 273 (1910).

16. On waiver, see 8 WTGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2340 (3d ed. 1940).
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testimony thereby made admissible. Among statutes creating a privilege
there is a further difference: some place the privilege in the communicating spouse; some, in the witness spouse.
Dean Wigmore argues convincingly that the purpose of protecting
marital confidence is adequately served by a privilege in the communicating
spouse. 17 It is his conduct which is intended to be influenced. If he is
apprehensive of public disclosure, he might hesitate to confide in his spouse.
The rule is aimed at dispelling any such apprehension on his part, and this
can most effectively be done by enabling him to prevent disclosure, rather
than by giving this ability to the other spouse or to the party against whom
the testimony is offered. His peace of mind is well secured when the admission of the testimony is conditioned upon his consent; and, therefore,
when he does consent, there is no harm in permitting disclosure. Evidence
is unnecessarily lost when someone else is able to prevent disclosure.' 8
B. The Nature of the Conduct Protected
Whatever the nature of the testimonial restriction which the statutes
create, it is almost always imposed upon the disclosure of "communications"
or "confidential communications" between husband and wife.' 9 Despite the
similarity of phrasing, the courts have not agreed upon the nature of the
conduct which comes within the immunity. Some courts protect only conduct
which is intended to transmit information from husband to wife. 21 Other
courts extend protection to conduct which is not intended to transmit information, but from which information is acquired. 21 However, the position
a court takes on this question does not define the scope of the immunity.
Disclosure of conduct which is not confidential in nature is ordinarily
allowed, 22 and conduct which is not intended to transmit information is apt
to be treated as non-confidential. 23 Ultimately, the application of a particular
statute is controlled by what the courts of that state believe necessary for the
protection of marital confidence.
17. Ibid.
18. Professor Vernier argues that the various rules do not have any effect upon the
conduct of husband and wife, and that they do have an obstructive effect upon the ascertainment of truth. He would do away with alJ the rules. 3 VERNIER, AMERIcAN FAMILY
LAWS § 226, p. 589 (1935).
19. 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 226 (1935).
20. Posner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56 Ariz. 202, 106 P. 2d 488 (1940) ; lit ri
Pusey's Estate, 180 Cal. 368, 181 Pac. 648 (1919) ; State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 260 Pac.

138, 146 (1927) ; Howard v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. Rep. 205, 280 S. W. 586 (1926).
21. Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 154 (1898) ; Todd v. Barbee, 271 Ky. 381,
111 S. W. 2d 1041 (1937) ; People v. Gessinger, 238 Mich. 625, 214 N. W. 184 (1927) ;
Whitehead v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61 So. 737 (1913) ; Menefee v. Commonwealth, 55
S. E. 2d 9 (Va. 1949).
22. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U. S. 7, 54 Sup. Ct. 279, 78 L. Ed. 617 (1934);
Lowry v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 349, 153 S. E. 11 (1930); Toole v. Toole, 112 N. C. 152, 16
S. E. 912 (1893).
23. Smith v. State, 198 Ind. 156, 152 N. E. 803 (1926) ; Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa
487, 105 N. W. 314 (1905).

1950o]

NOTES

III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT TENNESSEE RULE

:n Tennessee as in most other states husband and wife are now competent witnesses for or against each other, but their testimony is restricted to
prevent disclosure of private matters. It is not clear that the same restriction
is applicable to both civil and criminal cases. In this connection the history
of the development of the present rule is relevant.
A. In Civil Cases
The first step away from the common law rules of disqualification was
the passage in 1868 of a statute making parties and other interested persons
competent witnesses in civil cases. 24 The party spouse was thus enabled to
testify. However, it was soon held that he might not disclose information
25
acquired by reason of the marital relation, in the case of Hale v. Kearley.
In 1878 the incompetence of the witness spouse was removed by the
decision in Patton v. Wilson, 26 and a similar restriction was imposed upon

his testimony. In 1879 the present statute, now section 9777, was passed
providing that in civil cases "neither husband nor wife shall testify as to any
matter that occurred between them by virtue of or in consequence *of the
marital relation." 27
B. In Criminal Cases
Meamvhile, in criminal cases the common law remained unchanged.
After the criminal defendant was made competent by statute,28 *the
courts, following the reasoning of Patton v. Wilson, 'might have held his
24. Tenn. Acts 1868, c. 75, now incorporated in TENN. CODE ANN. § 9777 (Williams,
1934).
25. 67 Tenn. 49 (1874). Where husband and wife were joint or adverse parties, both

were incompetent, since their testimony would then be for or against each other. Self
v. Haun, 2 Tenn. Cas. 123 (1876); Guion v. Tuggle (Tenn. Sup Ct. 1873) [set out in
Patton v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 101, 108-10 (1878)]; cf. Hyden v. Hyden, 65 Tenn. 406
(1873). But cf. Foster v. McVann (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1878) (also set out in Patton v.
Wilson, supra at 111-12).
26. 70 Tenn. 101 (1878). The court held that interest was no longer a ground for
the incompetence of the witness-spouse. A prior case had held otherwise, reasoning that
the interest referred to by the statute was a pecuniary interest. Goodwin v. Nicklin, 53
Tenn. 256 (1871). A later case held that a wife is not a competent subscribing witness
to her husband's deed because of interest, since the statute did not apply to subscribing
witnesses. Bank v. O'Brien, 94 Tenn. 38, 28 S. W. 293 (1894). The policy of avoiding
discord had no weight because the marriage had terminated. Nevertheless, the holding was
affirmed in subsequent cases in which the marriage had not terminated. Orr v. Cox, 71
Tenn. 617 (1879) ; Lowery v. Petree, 76 Tenn. 674 (1881) ; Washington v. Bedford, 78
Tenn. 243 (1882).
27. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9777 (Williams, 1934). "In all civil actions, no person shall
be incompetent to testify because he is a party to, or interested in, the issue tried, or
because of the disabilities of coverture, but all persons, including husband and wife, shall
be competent witnesses, though neither husband nor wife shall testify as to any matter that
occurred between them by virtue of or in consequence of the marital relation."
28. Tenn. Acts 1887, c. 79, § 1, now TENN. CODE ANN. § 9782 (Williams, 1934).
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spouse competent also; but this was not done. 29 The courts would not
30
countenance the possibility of one spouse incriminating the other. In 1915
the legislature by statute made husband and wife competent witnesses for
and against each other in criminal cases.31 This statute placed no express
32
held that it
restriction upon their testimony; but McCormick v. State,

"did not abrogate the rule as to .. .confidential communications." 33 The
court thereby adopted a restriction substantially like that established by
section 9777 for civil cases.
TV.

THE NATURE

OF THE TESTIMONIAL

RESTRICTION

IN

TENNESSEE

A. Comparison with the Common Law Ruies
The present rule is more than a modification of the common law. The
common law rules were applicable to one spouse only, and made him incompetent in suits to which the other spouse was a party. The present rule,
at least in civil cases, is applicable to both spouses, preventing certain testimony by them, even in suits to which neither is a party. The common law
34
rules prohibited testimony concerning matters occurring before marriage;
3
the present rule applies only to matters occurring during the marriage. 5
Upon the termination of the marriage by death or divorce, the common law
6
rules ceased to be applicable in many states, although not in Tennessee;3
37
the present rule continues to be applicable.
B. Comparison with the Marital Communications Statutes
(1) In Civil Cases
Although the language of section 9777 is somewhat unique, it may be
classed with those statutes which make testimony concerning marital communications inadmissible.38 While a recent federal case determined that the
89
statute created a privilege and admitted testimony upon a waiver thereof,
the Tennessee courts have several times excluded testimony under section
40
9777 which both husband and wife were anxious to have admitted.
29. Owen v. State, 89 Tenn. 698, 16 S. W. 114 (1891).
30. Norman v. State, 127 Tenn. 340, 155 S.W. 135 (1912).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9778 (Williams, 1934). "In all criminal cases, the husband
or the wife shall be a competent witness to testify for or against each other."
32. 135 Tenn. 218, 186 S. W. 95 (1916).
33. Id. at 228, 188 S.W. at 97.
34. Norman v. State, 127 Tenn. 340, 155 S.W. 135 (1912).
35. Harp v. State, 158 Tenn. 510, 14 S.W. 2d 720 (1928).
36. State for the Use of Barker v. McAuley, 51 Tenn. 424 (1871); Kimbrough v.
Mitchell, 38 Tenn. 539 (1858) ; Brewer v. Ferguson, 30 Tenn. 564 (1851).
37. Patton v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 101 (1878) ; Williams v. Frazer, 6 Tenn. App. 211
(M. S.1927) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 30 F. 2d 80 (6th Cir. 1928).
38. Insurance Co. v. Shoemaker, 95 Tenn. 72, 31 S.W. 270 (1895).
39. Fraser v. United States, 145 F. 2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944).
40. Crane and Co. v. Hall, 141 Tenn. 556, 213 S.W. 414 (1919) ; Insurance Co. v.
-
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(2) In Criminal Cases
In criminal cases the testimony excluded is characterized sometimes as
-'privileged," sometimes as "incompetent." The terms are apparently used
interchangeably. In the few cases decided the result could have been reached
upon either theory. 41 Since the rule in criminal cases rests upon common law
principles, the cases applying section 9777 would probably not be controlling.
However, the earlier rule of Patton v. Wilson, which also rested upon common
law principles, apparently made the testimony inadmissible 42 and might be
considered controlling authority.
V.

THE NATURE OF THE TESTIMONY EXCLUDED IN TENNESSEE

A. In Civil Cases
In other states the statute usually speaks of "communications" or "confidential communications" between husband and wife. The protection given by
section 9777 is not so limited; it extends "to any matter that occurred between
them by virtue of ... the marital relation." In the leading case of Insurance

Co. v. Shoemaker 43 this language was interpreted as including "all transactions
and conversations had between the husband and wife in relation to their own
44
affairs, not in the presence of some third person."
Most of the cases involve transactions between husband and wife. When
no other person was present at the time of the transaction, neither may testify
to a loan, 45 or to a gift, 46 or to the delivery of a deed.47 Neither may testify to

facts which would establish a resulting trust.48 But either may testify to a
transaction between one spouse and a third person, 49 and apparently when one
spouse is acting as the agent of a third person he may testify to a transaction
with the other spouse.50 Testimony concerning ownership or possession of
Shoemaker, 95 Tenn. 72, 31 S. W. 270 (1895); State v. Caldwell, 21 Tenn. App. 396,
111 S.W. 2d 377 (M. S. 1937); Rober'tson v. Wade, 17 Tenn. App. 457, 68 S.W. 2d
487 (M. S.1933) ; Hornsby v. City National Bank, 60 S.W. 160 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900);
Young v. Hurst, 48 S.W. 355 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1898).
41. Cavert v. State, 158 Tenn. 531, 14 S.W. 2d 735 (1928) ; Harp v. State, 158 Tenn.
510, 14 S. W. 2d 720 (1928) ; McCormick v. State, 135 Tenn. 218, 186 S.W. 95 (1916).
42. Washington v. Bedford, 78 Tenn. 243 (1882); Hale v. Kearley, 67 Tenn. 49
(1874).
43. 95 Tenn. 72, 31 S.W. 270 (1895).
44. Id. at 82, 31 S. W. at 272.
45. Crane and Co. v. Hall, 141 Tenn. 556, 213 S.W. 414 (1919); McDonald v.
Baldwin, 24 Tenn. App. 670, 148 S.W. 2d 385 (M. S. 1940); Robertson v. Wade, 17
Tenn. App. 457, 68 S. W. 2d 487 (M. S.1933) ; Farmers Bank of Lynchbulg v. Farrar,
4 Tenn. App. 186 (M. S.1926).
46. State v. Caldwell, 21 Tenn. App. 396, 111 S.W. 2d 377 (M. S.1937); Young
v. Hurst, 48 S.W. 355 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1898).
47. Insurance Co. v. Shoemaker, 95 Tenn. 72, 31 S.W. 270 (1895).
48. Insurance Co. v. Shoemaker, 95 Tenn. 72, 31 S. W. 270 (1895); Hornsby v.
City National Bank, 60 S.W. 160 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900).
49. Renshaw v. First Nat. Bank, 63 S.W. 194 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900) ; Hill v. Fly,
52 S.W. 731 (Tenn. Ch.App. 1899).
50. Pilcher v. Rylee, 2 Tenn. App. 348 (W. S. 1925).
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property is also admissible, 51 so that a wife may testify that she owns a horse,
52
but not that her husband gave it to her.
Private conversations between husband and wife are excluded as a matter
54
53
Letters from one to the other are likewise excluded.
course.
of
B. In Criminal Cases
In criminal cases the rule does not necessarily prohibit the same testimony which is excluded under section 9777. The typical civil case involves a
contest over property between the wife and the husband's creditors. The wife's
claim is based on a legal transaction with the husband. Both husband and wife
55
are anxious to testify to the transaction, but their testimony is excluded.
This result is in accord with the established construction of section 9777, but
it cannot be justified as necessary to the protection of marital confidence. In
the first place the disclosure would be entirely voluntary. In the second place
the holding would hardly encourage legal transactions between husband and
wife. Finally, there is no apparent reason why the law should encourage such
transactions. Since the rule in criminal cases rests directly upon a policy of
protecting marital confidence, 55 and no statute forecloses the question, a different result might well be reached upon similar facts.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has formulated three different statements
of the scope of the rule in criminal cases: (1) It has been said to be coexten7
sive with the rule in civil cases as stated in Insurance Co. v. Shoemaker. (2)
8
It has been said to prohibit disclosure of confidential communications. As
thus stated the rule would apparently not include legal transactions. (3) It
has been said to prohibit disclosure of all information acquired by reason of

51. Insurance Co. v. Shoemaker, 95 Tenn. 72, 31 S. W. 270 (1895) ; State v. Cald-

well, 21 Tenn. App. 396, 111 S. W. 2d 377 (M. S. 1937); Young v. Hurst, 48 S. W. 355

(Tenn. Cli. App. 1898).
52. The strict application of the rule to legal transactions between husband and wife
may be influenced by a desire to protect creditors from fraud. Even when the testimony
of husband and wife is admitted without objection, it is not sufficient without corroboration
to establish a legal transaction to the prejudice of a third person. Crane and Co. v. Hall.
141 Tenn. 556, 213 S. W. 414 (1919) (contract) ; Insurance Co. v. Shoemaker, 95 Tenn.
72, 31 S. W. 270 (1895) (resulting trust) ; State v. Caldwell, 21 Tenn. App. 396, 111 S. W.
2d 377 (M. S. 1937) (gift); Sanford v. Allen, 42 S. W. 183 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1897)
(debt).
53. Insurance Co. v. Shoemaker, 95 Tenn. 72, 31 S. W. 270 (1895); Petway v.
Hoover, 12 Tenn. App. 618 (M. S. 1931); Young v. Hurst, 48 S. W. 355 (Tenn. Ch. App.
1898).
54. McCormick v. State, 135 Tenn. 218, 186 S. W. 95 (1916); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Ross, 30 F. 2d 80 (6th Cir. 1928). But cf. E. W. M. v. J. C. M., 2
Tenn. Ch. App. 463 (1897).
55. Among cases which fit this description are those cited in note 40 supra.
56. Harp v. State, 158 Tenn. 510, 14 S. W. 2d 720 (1928).
57. Cavert v. State, 158 Tenn. 531, 14 S. W. 2d 735 (1928). After quoting the rule
of the Shoemaker case, the court adds: "This rule is applied, perhaps, with more strictness in criminal cases." Id. at 542. 14 S. W. 2d at 739.
58. Harp v. State, 158 Tenn. 510, 513, 14 S. W. 2d 720 (1928) ; McCormick v. State,
135 Tenn. 218, 228, 186 S. W. 95, 97 (1916).
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the marital relation. 59 As thus stated the rule would logically apply only to the
testimony of the spouse acquiring the information. So few cases have considered
the problem that it cannot be said which statement of the rule is likely to be

sanctioned.
C. Testimony by a Third Person
It is well settled in Tennessee that a third person may testify to matters
which occur between husband and wife in his presence. 60 But if the matter
occurs privately he may not disclose information given him by husband or wife
concerning the matter.61 However, if this information leads to the discovery of
62
other facts, he may testify to the facts discovered.
VI. EXCEPTIONS

The Tennessee courts strongly favor the policy of protecting marital confidence. They apply the rule although "detached situations . . . might seem to
require its destruction." 63 As a result there are few exceptions to the rule.
One well-established exception is that matters occurring in the presence of
other persons are not within the rule.6 4 This exception does not extend to
letters which come into the hands of other persons. 65
Many of the marital communications statutes are expressly inapplicablp
when husband and wife are adverse parties. 66 The Tennessee courts have
declined to imply such an exception in the absence of statute. 67 However, by
recent amendment, section 9777 does not apply to divorce cases. 65 The courts
may be willing to recognize a like exception in other cases involving the wel69
fare of children.
At common law the wife might testify to physical mistreatment by the
59. Cavert v. State, 158 Tenn. 531, 544, 14 S. W. 2d 735, 739 (1928) ; Harp v. State,
158 Tenn. 510, 513, 14 S. W. 2d 720 (1928); McCormick v. State, 135 Tenn..218, 228,
186 S. W. 95, 97 (1916).
60. Allison v. Barrow, 43 Tenn. 414 (1866) ; Queener v. Morrow, 41 Tenn. 73 (1860);
6 TENN. L. REv. 285 (1928).
61. English v. Ricks, 117 Tenn. 73, 95 S. W. 189 (1906); Pearson v. McCallum,
26 Tenn. App. 413, 173 S. W. 2d 150 (W. S. 1941).
62. Clark v. State, 159 Tenn. 507, 19 S. W. 2d 228 (1929).
63. Harp v. State, 158 Tenn. 510, 513, 14 S. W. 2d 720 (1928).
64. Insurance Co. v. Shoemaker, 95 Tenn. 72, 31 S. W. 270 (1895).
65. McCormick v. State, 135 Tenn. 218, 186 S. W. 95 (1916).
66. 3 VERNIER, AmERICAN 'FAMILY LAWS § 226 (1935).
67. Jackson v. Jackson, 186 Tenn. 337, 210 S. W. 2d 332 (1947), 2 VAND. L. REv.
130 (1948). The question had been reserved in Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 80 S. W. 2d
666 (1934).
68. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 55, § 1. The same result had been reached in Gardner v.
Gardner, 104 Tenn. 410, 58 S. W. 342 (1900) and in E. W. M. v. J. C. M., 2 Tenn. Ch.
App. 463 (1897) ; but these cases were overruled by Jackson v. Jackson, 186 Tenn. 337,
210 S. W. 2d 332 (1947), 2 VAND. L. REv. 130 (1948).
69. Gower v. State, 155 Tenn. 138, 290 S. W. 978 (1926). Husband or wife may
testify to intercourse during the pendency of a divorce suit. The thorough opinion of
Chief Justice Green does not suggest that the rule announced in McCormick v. State,
135 Tenn. 218, 186 S. W. 95 (1916), would, if raised, prohibit the testimony.

306

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VoL. 3

husband upon the theory that this was necessary for her protection? 0 The
1
courts would probably sanction a similar exception to the present rule.7
A recent federal case concluded that the rule was not applicable to acts or
communications in furtherance of a fraud? 2 But in an analogous Tennessee
case the rule was held to apply to acts and communications which tended to
establish a conspiracy between husband and wife.

3

VII. CONCLUSION
That section 9777 encourages a free exchange of confidences between husband and wife cannot easily be established or disproved. Any effect that the
statute might have upon their private conduct would necessarily be subtle.
However, good reasons may be advanced for certain modifications of the
statute.
Section 9777 might be amended so that the acting or communicating
spouse would have the option to allow or to prevent disclosure of his conduct.
Any apprehension of disclosure which he might have would be effectively removed by giving him the ability to prevent it. On the other band there is no
reason why he should not be able to disclose his own conduct voluntarily or
to allow his spouse to do so.
This section might further be improved by the exception of matters which
are clearly not of a confidential nature. This exception would in no wise impair
the policy of protecting marital confidence. It would allow the courts some
discretion in administering that policy.
It would perhaps be more desirable for the legislature to enact a new
statute applicable to criminal as well is civil cases. Any doubt concerning the
rule in criminal cases would thereby be removed; and reconsideration of the
subject in entirety might well prove profitable.
The following provision is recommended for consideration:
"No person shall be incompetent as a witness in any case because of marital condition or relationship; but confidential communications between husband and wife shall
not be disclosed without the consent of the spouse making the communication, except
that in divorce actions either husband or wife may testify as to communications between them, whether confidential or not."
BARRETT

B.

SUTTON

70. See Norman v. State, 127 Tenn. 340, 349, 155 S. W. 135, 137 (1912).
71. However, it has been held that testimony concerning acts of cruelty is not admissible in a suit for divorce. Jackson v. Jackson, 186 Tenn. 337, 210 S. W. 2d 332 (1947),
2 VAND. L. Rxv. 130 (1948).
72. Fraser v. United States, 145 F. 2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944).
73. Cavert v. State, 158 Tenn. 531, 14 S. W. 2d 735 (1928).

